Restriction of Police Power
Private Corporate State / Municipality Policy Enforcement Officer a.k.a Police Officer Duties and limitations of power "Nothing is gained in the argument by calling it ^police power.'" Henderson v. City of New York , 92 U.S. 259, 2771 (1875); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 501 (1934) .
"An officer who acts in violation of the Constitution ceases to represent the government." Brookfield Const. Co. v. Stewart , 284 F.Supp. 94. Failure to obey the command of a police officer constitutes a traditional form of breach of the peace. Obviously, however, one cannot be punished for failing to obey the command of an officer if that command is itself violative of the constitution . Wright v. Georgia , 373 U.S. 284, 291-2.
That an officer or employee of a state or one of its subdivisions is deemed to be acting under "color of law" as to those deprivations of right committed in the fulfillment of the tasks and obligations assigned to him. Monroe v. Page , 1961, 365 U.S. 167. (Civil law) Actions by state officers and employees, even if unauthorized or in excess of authority, can be actions under "color of law." Stringer v. Dilger , 1963, Ca. 10 Colo., 313 F.2d 536. (Civil law)
"The police power of the state must be exercised in subordination to the provisions of the U.S. Constitution." Bacahanan vs. Wanley , 245 US 6 0; Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. vs. State Highway Commission, 2 94 US 613.
"With regard particularly to the U.S. Constitution, it is elementary that a Right secured or protected by that document cannot be overthrown or impaired by any state police authority. " Donnolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 US 54 0; Lafarier vs. Grand Trunk R.R. Co., 24 A. 848; O'Neil vs. Providence Amusement Co., 108 A. 887.
Although the Fourteenth Amendment does not interfere with the proper exercise of the police power, in accordance with the general principle that the power must be exercised so as not to invade unreasonably the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, it is established beyond question that every state power, including the police power, is limited by the Fourteenth Amendment (and others) and by the inhibitions there imposed.
Moreover, the ultimate test of the propriety of police power regulations must be found in the Fourteenth Amendment, since it operates to limit the field of the police power to the extent of preventing the enforcement of statutes in denial of Rights that the Amendment protects. (See Parks vs. State, 64 NE 682.)
"With regard particularly to the U.S. Constitution, it is elementary that a Right secured or protected by that document cannot be overthrown or impaired by any state police authority." Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 US 540; Lafarier vs. Grand Trunk R.R. Co., 24 A. 848; O'Neil vs. Providence Amusement Co., 108 A. 887
"The police power of the state must be exercised in subordination to the provisions of the U.S. Constitution." Bacahanan vs. Wanley, 245 US 60; Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. vs. State Highway Commission, 294 US 613
"It is well settled that the Constitutional Rights protected from invasion by the police power, include Rights safeguarded both by express and implied prohibitions in the Constitutions." Tiche vs. Osborne, 131 A. 60
"As a rule, fundamental limitations of regulations under the police power are found in the spirit of the Constitutions, not in the letter, although they are just as efficient as if expressed in the clearest language." Mehlos vs. Milwaukee, 146 NW 882
When officers detained appellant for the purpose of requiring him to identify himself, they performed a seizure of his person subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment . . . The Fourth Amendment, of course, applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest... Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person, and the Fourth Amendment requires that the seizure be 'reasonable'.
* "But even assuming that purpose (prevention of crime) is served to some degree by stopping and demanding identification from an individual without any specific basis for believing he is involved in criminal activity, the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment do not allow it."
* "The application of . . . (a code) . . .to detain appellant and require him to identify himself violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe appellant was engaged, or had engaged, in criminal conduct. Accordingly, appellant may not be punished for refusing to identify himself, and the conviction is reversed." (Probable cause) Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, (1979)
* "Traffic infractions are not a crime." People v. Battle , 50 Cal. App. 3, step 1, Super, 123 Cal. Rptr. 636, 639.
Infractions are not crimes...upon the rationale the Legislature did not intend to classify infractions as crimes. People v. Sava (1987) 190 Cal. App. 3d 935, 235 Cal. Rptr. 694 [No. D005040, Court of Appeals District, Division One. March 27, 1987.]
"To this end, the Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure must be based on specific objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.
"The officers of the law, in the execution of process, are required to know the requirements of the law, and if they mistake them, whether through ignorance or design, and anyone is harmed by their error, they must respond in damages." Roger v. Marshall (United States use of Rogers v. Conklin) , 1 Wall. (US) 644, 17 Led 714.
“Speeding, running stop signs, traveling without license plates, or registration are not threats to the public safety, and thus are not arrestable offenses.” Christy v. Elliot, 216 I 131, 74 HE 1035, LRA NS 1905-1910
“Speeding, driving without a license, wrong plates or no plates, no registration, no tags, etc., have been held to be “non-arrestable offenses” (Cal V. Farley, 98 Cal. Rep. 89, 20 CA 3d 1032)
Licenses are for the conduct of a business, profession, occupation, the exercise of such when they are a privilege. licensing is in the nature of a SPECIAL PRIVILEGE entitling licensee to do some thing that he would not be entitled to do without a license. San Fransisco v Liverpool, 74 Cal 113